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Citizenship Education for Child Citizens

Brian Howe (University College of Cape Breton)
Abstract: One important reason for the inadequacy of current citizenship education is
that children – defined here as all young persons under age 18 - are rarely seen and
treated as citizens in their own right. To the extent that children are educated about
citizenship, they typically learn about their rights and responsibilities as future adult
citizens. They rarely learn that they are citizens of the present and they are rarely treated
as such. This article reviews the modern meaning of citizenship and shows, in reference
to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, that children indeed are citizens of the
present. It shows that when the ingredients of the modern understanding of citizenship are
applied to children – rights, responsibilities, participation, and differentiated citizenship –
children need to be recognized as citizens. Such an understanding, it is contended, is a
necessary foundation for successful citizenship education.

Résumé : Une cause importante du caractère inadéquat de l’éducation à la citoyenneté
actuelle est que les enfants – définis ici comme toutes les personnes de moins de 18 ans –
sont rarement vus et traités comme des citoyens à part entière. Dans la mesure où les
enfants sont éduqués à propos de la citoyenneté, ils apprennent habituellement des
notions sur leurs droits et responsabilités qu’ils auront une fois adultes. Ils apprennent
rarement qu’ils sont déjà eux-mêmes des citoyens et qu’ils devraient être traités comme
tels. Cet article analyse la signification moderne de la citoyenneté et montre, en se basant
sur la Convention des Droits de l’enfant des Nations-Unies, que les enfants sont
effectivement des citoyens dans le présent. Ainsi, lorsque les ingrédients de la
compréhension moderne de la citoyenneté sont appliqués aux enfants – droits,
responsabilités, participation et citoyenneté différenciée –, les enfants doivent être
reconnus comme citoyens. L’auteur soutient qu’une telle compréhension est un
fondement nécessaire pour la réussite de l’éducation à la citoyenneté.

Failure of Citizenship Education and Conception of Child as Citizen
Recent studies of citizenship education conducted by Judith Torney-Purta and
her colleagues (2001) across 28 countries consistently demonstrate that current
approaches are failing to meet the goals of providing students with the
knowledge, skills and motivations that promote democratic citizenship.
Wondering about possible reasons for this failure, this article suggests that the
lack of recognition and treatment of the child as citizen is significant to the
inadequacy of current approaches to education for citizenship.

42 Canadian and International Education Vol. 34 no. 1 - June 2005

The Modern Meaning of Citizenship
The modern conception of democratic citizenship has evolved to include at least
four basic ingredients or qualities, beyond the narrow legal definition of
citizenship as simply legal membership in a political community. A first
ingredient is the enjoyment of basic rights. Writing after the Second World War,
British sociologist T.H. Marshall (1950) made the case that what was central to
citizenship was not simply legal membership in a political community but also
the sense of membership or belonging. For Marshall, what was necessary to
giving people a sense of belonging was their possession and enjoyment of basic
rights. If people in a political community have basic political, civil, and social
rights, and know that they have these rights, they will have the sense that they
have value and thus that they belong. Having these rights, they will be sent the
message by society that they are true members of their political community.
A second ingredient is the exercise of responsibilities. As pointed out by Will
Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (1995) among others, possessing rights is an
inadequate component of citizenship. Too much focus on individual rights
allows for, or even promotes, passivity among citizens and inordinate attention
on private life. It encourages a self-regarding or entitlement culture where
citizens are centered on their own rights and interests without sufficient attention
to their broader social responsibilities as citizens. If all that citizens did was to
focus on their own rights and private interests, the long-term health and viability
of a liberal democratic society, supportive of rights, would be put into jeopardy.
Who would be there to support it? Thus the concept of citizenship has to make
room for responsibilities as well as rights. Exercising social responsibility is
important because it gives support to the political community. Laws have to be
obeyed and the rights of others have to be respected. It also is important because
it contributes to promoting the sense of belonging so desired by Marshall. One is
more likely to feel connected to community if one is exercising social
responsibility.
A third quality is active participation, as given emphasis by Carole Pateman
(1970) and in studies of participatory democracy in the tradition of Pateman
(Berman, 1997). From this perspective, participation is connected to having
rights and responsibilities but it is more than this. That citizens have the right to
input into decision-making provides them with an opportunity for participation.
But in a liberal democratic society, citizens also have the right not to participate
(or be apathetic). Thus having a sense of social responsibility is also a
component of participation. However, opportunities have to be in place for the
exercise of responsibility. The main point about participation is that although it
is connected to both rights and responsibilities, it is also important to citizenship
in its own right. It is a practice that is learned through experience in society – in
families, schools, voluntary associations, workplaces – that promotes a sense of
efficacy and, in turn, the actual exercising of the rights and responsibilities of
citizenship. According to Pateman (1970, p. 105), “we learn to participate by
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participating.” From democratic participation come feelings of political efficacy,
which in turn lead to a sense of social responsibility and to further participation.
Participation is important because it gives life to democratic citizenship and
because it contributes to a key purpose of citizenship – promoting a sense of
belonging.
Finally, a fourth ingredient is differentiated citizenship or pluralistic citizenship
as given attention by Iris Young (1989). Marshall had made the case for uniform
or common citizenship: that all citizens would have a sense of belonging
through having and enjoying the same rights of citizenship. For Young, this is
problematic in that it raises difficulties for promoting a sense of belonging and
inclusion. If uniform or common citizenship is pursued completely, and if group
differences within a political community are ignored or downgraded, members
of many groups may feel excluded or slighted, the effect contrary to the sense of
belonging held to be so important by Marshall. For example, special treaty rights
or traditional hunting rights are important for many aboriginal communities.
Rights associated with multiculturalism are important for many ethnic and
cultural minorities. An emphasis on common citizenship rights without regard to
group differences would be detrimental to promoting a sense of belonging
among these groups. Thus for Young and others, in order to cultivate the sense
of belonging, it is better to recognize group differences in citizenship and the
different configuration of rights and responsibilities for different groups in
society. Although some rights of citizenship may be shared, other rights are
unique and differentiated.

The Exclusion of Children as Citizens
Understanding citizenship to include rights, responsibilities, participation, and
group differentiation is a welcome development. But what is not welcome is the
exclusion of children as citizens. As a matter of legality, children are legal
citizens in virtually all states of the world by virtue of birth or naturalization.
But as a matter of adult consciousness and practice, they are not recognized and
treated as citizens. They tend to be either ignored as citizens or regarded in an
adult-centric fashion as citizens of the future rather than of the present. They
typically are seen not as citizens but as “not-yets” or “pre-citizens” (Stasiulis,
2002. p. 509).
In the literature on citizenship, for example, there has been a major focus on the
need for social inclusion and to incorporate women, minorities, and
marginalized groups into citizenship (Hébert, 2002). Important though this is,
very little attention has been given to children as citizens. In the literature on
citizenship education in schools, major attention has been given to ways to
prepare and train children for future adult citizenship. Books have been written
on the subject of educating “tomorrow’s citizens” (Pearce & Hallgarten, 2000).
The function of schools has been described as preparing “each new generation
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for their responsibilities as citizens” (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 293). But the concept
of children as citizens in the here and now has been noticeably absent. Reviews
of curricula materials and of citizenship education programs show that attention
continues to be given to children as tomorrow’s citizens, not as today’s citizens
with today’s rights of citizenship (Howe & Covell, 2005).
When the possibility of child citizenship is raised, the principle is rejected on the
basis that children do not have the means or capacity to meet the standards of
adult citizenship. One argument against children as citizens is their economic
dependency (Coles, 1995). Dependent on their parents or guardians, they are not
in a position to form autonomous views and to make the independent judgments
necessary for the practice of citizenship. They are likely to be unduly swayed by
their parents or other adult authorities. But the problem with this argument is
that could be used against many groups who make claims for inclusion in
citizenship: stay-at-home mothers or fathers or many university students,
seniors, and adults with disabilities who are in a financially dependent situation.
It is dangerous to make financial independence a strict requirement for
citizenship. While dependence may influence the way some people form
opinions or make decisions in relation to citizenship, this does not justify the
blanket denial of citizenship and the rights and responsibilities that go with it.
Citizenship is about inclusion, not economic independence.
Another and more serious argument against child citizenship is that children,
unlike adults, do not have the rational capacity for citizenship as they do not
have the necessary cognitive development, level of maturity, and self-control
(Purdy, 1992; Roche, 1999). It is in the best interests of children not to be
burdened with the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Childhood is a
period in which children need to have their actions controlled and their freedoms
curtailed such that they are able to acquire the self-control and maturity
necessary for responsible adulthood and citizenship. However, a problem with
this argument is that it draws too sharp of a distinction between childhood and
adulthood (Flekkoy & Kaufman, 1997). There is no magic moment when a
child suddenly becomes an adult. Development occurs across the lifespan and
much of it is incremental. Moreover, there is much evidence that the cognitive
ability of children increases when they are treated with respect and assumed to
be capable (Alderson, 1992). Another problem with the argument is that it
assumes some threshold level of rationality as a requirement for citizenship.
Even if one could identify with precision what this threshold level is, the
assumption of rationality as a requirement runs contrary to the essential meaning
of citizenship derived from Marshall. Citizenship is about inclusion and
belonging, not cognitive ability. Although we may agree that some forms of
participation require a certain general level of maturity (e.g., voting in national
elections), this does not mean that children have nothing to offer as citizens
through age-appropriate forms of participation. Citizenship is not reducible to
voting.
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Understanding Children as Citizens
If it is agreed that the major ingredients of citizenship include rights,
responsibilities, participation, and differentiated citizenship, and that a key
purpose is to cultivate a sense of belonging, the question is whether or not
children qualify as citizens. If we apply each of these ingredients to children, we
see that they do qualify.
First, children qualify as citizens in light of the concept of differentiated
citizenship. On the one hand, they have certain rights and responsibilities similar
to those of adults under the domestic law of many states and under international
law and conventions. For example, it is widely accepted that children have a
basic right to life and security of person. They also have the same general
responsibility to obey the law and respect the rights of others. But on the other
hand, they have rights and responsibilities particular to children as a class of
persons. For example, they have the right to protection from abuse and neglect
in the home. They also have responsibility to obey the law (assuming the law to
be a just law) but in accordance with their age and maturity. As young offenders,
their level of responsibility and accountability is not the same as for adults. In
short, like other groups of citizens, child citizens have a somewhat different
configuration of the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. They cannot be
ruled out as citizens simply because they do not have the same rights and
responsibilities as others.
Second, children qualify as citizens on the basis of having certain basic rights.
The most comprehensive statement on the rights of the child is found in the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child, a legally binding international treaty
ratified by almost all countries of the world (Verhellen, 1997). By ratifying the
Convention, states have agreed to recognize and provide for children’s rights to
protection (e.g., from abuse, neglect, economic exploitation, sexual
exploitation), to provision (e.g., of basic needs such as health care and economic
welfare), and to participation in decisions affecting the child. What is unique
about these rights, in line with the concept of differentiated citizenship, is that
they are to be exercised in accord with the “evolving capacities” of the child,
with the guidance of parents or guardians, and with the assistance of the state.
State authorities have the important obligation to ensure the implementation of
the rights of the child.
Third, children are citizens by virtue of having responsibilities of citizenship. As
with their rights, the exercise and level of their responsibilities is recognized to
be in accord with their evolving capacities. Child citizens have the same general
responsibility as adults to obey the law and respect the rights of others. But the
level of responsibility expected from a child citizen is age-differentiated. Very
young children, for example, have a moral responsibility to obey the law but not
legal accountability. Older children have a legal as well as a moral responsibility
to do so, but not full legal responsibility and accountability. Most countries have
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juvenile justice systems in which young offenders are held accountable for
breaking the law but not to the same degree as adults. Older children also have
age-appropriate political responsibility such as voting in student elections or
doing community service in schools. In short, in line with their evolving
capacities, child citizens do have the responsibilities of citizenship.
Fourth, children qualify as citizens on the basis of their participation in the
political community. It is important, however, that the meaning of child
participation be clear. According to article 12 of the Convention, children have
the right to participate in decisions affecting them, their views to be given
weight in accord with their age and maturity. What this means is that although
the views of children need not be decisive, children do have the right to input
into decisions that affect them, whether in families, schools, local communities,
or wider decision-making bodies (Hodgkin & Newell, 1998). This does not
imply that they have the right to participate in the same form and at the same
level as adult citizens (e.g., in voting or running for office in national elections).
But it does mean that child citizens have the right to be heard in an ageappropriate fashion and that decision-making authorities have the obligation to
listen and give weight to the voices of children in relation to their age and
maturity.

From Principle to Practice
As a matter of principle, the right of the child citizen to participate in decisionmaking is recognized globally by virtue of the fact that almost all the countries
of the world have ratified the Convention. In agreeing to article 12, states have
agreed not only to the right but also to their obligation to assist in providing for
this right by putting into place structures, mechanisms, and processes to
facilitate child participation. However, as a matter of practice, the extent of child
participation is limited, haphazard, and very incomplete, reflecting a lack of
adult and state commitment to the principle of child citizenship. Although child
participation does takes place in democratic families, democratic classrooms,
and processes that allow for child and youth input in community decisionmaking, the practice is sporadic rather than comprehensive. If commitment
actually existed, child citizen participation would be practiced on a much wider
scale.
The practice of child participation is desirable not only because it is a right but
also because it is beneficial to democracy. If we think of democracy as
participatory democracy, rather than simply electoral and representative
democracy, child participation is a force for healthier democracy. A
participatory democracy requires a participatory society where democratic
participation takes place in families, schools, and daily life. Through early
participation, child citizens develop a sense of efficacy, empowering them to
become more active participants in a later practice of citizenship (Pateman,
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1970; Berman, 1997). And if we also think of democracy as deliberative
democracy, where decision-making is based on a deliberative process of
discussion, debate, and learning the perspectives of all parties affected by a
decision, child participation is a force for healthier democracy (Kulynych, 2001;
Young, 1997). Through inviting and gaining the perspectives of all parties
including children, and through taking into account the interests of all parties
including children, decision-makers will be in a position to make better
decisions and more legitimate decisions.

Conclusion: Child as Citizen Basic for Robust Citizenship Education
Thus the basic ingredients of citizenship apply to children as well as to adults.
Like adults, children have a need for a sense of belonging to their community. If
a key purpose of citizenship is to promote a sense of belonging and a sense of
value, then it is important that children and youth be recognized for who they
are – citizens. It is important that they not be devalued and belittled as immature
not-yets and pre-citizens who are in need of training. The problem is that they
are seldom recognized as the citizens that they are. Treated as mere not-yets,
many children and youth feel a deep sense of exclusion and alienation from
society (Berman, 1997; Scales et al, 2001). This reflects a failure in the practice
of inclusive citizenship and in programs of citizenship education in schools.
What is necessary is a robust program of citizenship education in schools that is
consistent with the status of children as citizens. As detailed elsewhere (Howe &
Covell, 2005), children’s rights education (contextualized in and informed by
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) is effective in providing
citizenship education that is engaging and participatory and that teaches children
about their rights and responsibilities as citizens of today as well as of
tomorrow. The main point here is that an important step in the direction of
developing effective citizenship education is to begin by recognizing and
respecting children as citizens. If the key purpose of citizenship is to cultivate a
sense of belonging and a sense of value, the recognition of children as citizens is
essential to this enterprise.
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